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1.1  Introduction 
The phenomenal expansion of East Asia’s’ intraregional trade-from  $1 16 
billion to $265 billion between 1985 and 1990-has  raised the prospect of an 
East Asian economic bloc that could more than match the scale of either the 
European or North American trading area. This bloc would inevitably be domi- 
nated by  Japan, and thus trade frictions between Japan and the United States 
could be generalized into a massive confrontation among giant economies. 
Against  the  background  of  declining  U.S.  competitiveness  and  suspicions 
about the “fairness” of  global markets, some observers see sinister motives 
behind growing East Asian interdependence. Some scholars even go so far as 
to argue that Japan’s recent investment, aid, and trade patterns “cloak political 
and conquistadorial designs similar to those in the past” (Montgomery 1988, 
xiii). 
These issues are examined here in a historical and analytical context. I will 
show that East Asia has been and continues to be a trading bloc in the sense 
that its trade is more regionally oriented than would be expected on the basis 
of random trade patterns. As Frankel shows in chapter 2 of this volume, this is 
true even while controlling for geographical proximity. Moreover, East Asian 
interdependence has intensified in the last five or so years. But I will also show 
that  recent  increases  in  interdependence  are  small in  a  historical  context, 
and that the East Asian economy has steadily disintegrated during the previous 
three decades. East Asia is less interdependent today than it was for most of 
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the twentieth century, save for short periods of time in the aftermath of World 
War  I1 and during the mid-1980s. The key long-term story has been the shift 
of East Asian linkages from regional partners to a more diversified group of 
countries, including the United States.* 
Nevertheless, there is reason to see 1985 as a turning point in these trends. 
East Asian interdependence has not greatly intensified so far, but the break 
with previous trends is clear. In addition, still larger changes have taken place 
in investment linkages, and these foreshadow future trade changes. These de- 
velopments, combined with anecdotal evidence on how individual agents and 
governments are stepping up investments in regional linkages, suggest that 
from now on the East Asian trading bloc may  be strengthening rather than 
continuing to dissolve. 
The analytical base of this paper is a simple model of bloc formation. The 
model begins with the idea that a trading bloc’s intrabloc bias-its  preference 
for inside rather than outside partners-rests  on low intrabloc transaction costs 
compared to outside-bloc transaction costs. Intrabloc transaction costs can be 
reduced by investments in intrabloc linkages-for  example, in transport links, 
economic policies that facilitate  integration, or information about  regional 
business opportunities. These investments, in turn, depend on economic and/ 
or political developments that draw the bloc’s countries closer together. The 
process of bloc formation is dynamic, because a growing volume of intrabloc 
trade itself provides incentives for investing in linkages. Thus “historical acci- 
dents” that bring economies together may well be amplified and perpetuated 
by the linkage investments that they induce. 
Three major historical developments are important for understanding East 
Asian interdependence. The first is the development of Asian treaty ports in 
the nineteenth century, which established a network of  trade driven by  major 
ports  such as Singapore, Hong Kong,  Manila, and  Shanghai. A  second is 
Japan’s imperial expansion, which created a very high level of economic inte- 
gration among the economies of northern East Asia. Finally, the spectacular 
growth of  the region’s economies is emerging as a new force for integration 
today: as East Asian countries are becoming increasingly important to each 
other, they are beginning to invest heavily in linkages that are very  likely to 
increase their intraregional bias. 
It is also possible to identify forces that have worked against regional inte- 
gration in the postwar period. These include the central role of  the United 
States in the postwar Pacific economy, the rapid economic development of the 
region, which enabled its economies to enter many new global markets, and 
the general integration of  the world economy due to trade liberalization and 
improvements in transport and communications. This paper attempts to trace 
2. The importance of the United States in the Pacific trade network is examined in some detail 
in Petri (1992).  That study concludes that these transpacific connections make it unlikely that any 
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how the changing balance of these pro- and antiregional forces has led to the 
complex pattern of rises and declines that have characterized East Asian eco- 
nomic integration. 
1.2  Measures of Interdependence 
There is no single, widely accepted measure of  interdependence. As we 
shall see, the reason for this is that the appropriateness of a particular measure 
depends on the uses to which it is put. Briefly, three different types of measures 
are frequently used. Let x,~  represent exports from country i to countryj, and 
the subscript. (in place of  i orj) represent the summation across all i orj. Thus 
x,, represents the total exports of country i, x*~  the total imports of countryj, 
and x,, total world trade. In this notation, the three commonly used concepts of 
interdependence are (1) absolute measures of trading intensity, which deflate a 
particular bilateral (or intraregional) trade flow with overall world trade: 
A =  X,/X,.; 
(2)  relative measures of trading intensity, which deflate absolute intensity with 
either the worldwide export share of the exporting country, or the worldwide 
import share of the importing country: 
B = A/(xJx*J  =  x,~/x,.  or  B’  =  X,~/X.,; 
and (3)  double-relative measures of trading intensity, which deflate absolute 
intensity with both the worldwide export share of the exporting country and 
the worldwide import share of the importing country: 
C = A/{(x,Jx*J  (x+&  = x,x,Jx,,x.,. 
In effect, measure A compares the scale of a particular bilateral (or intrare- 
gional) trading relationship to worldwide averages, measure B compares it to 
the trade shares of  one or the other of the two partners participating in the 
relationship, and measure C compares it to the product of the trade shares of 
both partners. These indexes of trading intensity can evolve quite differently 
over time. For example, exports from X to Y could grow rapidly compared to 
world trade (rising  A measure), but could still fail to keep pace with X’s rapidly 
increasing share of world exports or Y‘s rapidly increasing share of world im- 
ports (declining C measure). The double-relative measures calculated as the 
C measure in this study are commonly described as “gravity coefficients” in 
the literat~re.~ 
Each of these measures of  trading intensity is appropriate for answering a 
particular type of question. For example, if  one is interested in the relative 
stakes or influence of different groups of countries in global trade negotiations, 
3. Some of the early studies based on gravity coefficients include Linnemann (1966) and Leon- 
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it may make sense to compare their trade volumes to world levels by using an 
absolute intensity index. Alternatively, if one wants to know to what extent a 
country will respond to the interests of a particular partner (or group of part- 
ners), then the intensity of the bilateral (intrabloc) trading relationship is best 
judged using a relative measure (in effect, the share of  the partner[s] in the 
country’s trade). Finally, if one wants to assess the extent of trade biases toward 
particular partners (or groups of partners) relative to the neutral of assignment 
of  trade across all partners, then  double-relative indexes, or gravity  coeffi- 
cients, provide an appropriate answer. 
The evolution of East Asian interdependence is summarized, using each of 
three measures defined above, in table 1.1 and figures 1.1-1.3.  The data used 
represent  the longest consistent  time  series available  on international trade 
flows, and were assembled from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction 
of  Trade and its many precursor publications. The measures shown are all cal- 
culated for two-way trade, that is, with xu  defined as the sum of both exports 
and imports between i andj  (not just as exports from i toj  as in the previous 
discussion). 
In  absolute  terms  (table  1.1 and  fig.  l.l), East  Asian  intratrade  is  only 
slightly larger than North American intratrade, and considerably smaller than 
Western European intratrade. Indeed, East Asia’s share of world trade is still 
smaller than it was during the height of the Japanese empire before World War 
Table 1.1  Measures of Regional Interdependence (exports plus imports) 
1938  I955  1969  1979  1985  1990 
Absolute measure: 

































































































1920  1mo  1940  1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  ZOO0 








1920  19u)  1940  1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2ooo 
Fig. 1.2  East Asian interdependence: relative 
11.  Nevertheless, over the postwar period East Asian intratrade has grown very 
fast, nearly quadrupling its share of world trade. 
In relative terms, East Asian intratrade shows a U-shaped pattern (fig. 1.2). 
By this measure, East Asian interdependence fell sharply as the Japanese em- 
pire was dismantled, and continued to decline well into the postwar period. 
During this period, despite the rapidly growing absolute volume of East Asian 
intratrade, the relative importance of regional trade fell, since the region’s third- 
country trade developed even  more rapidly. Eventually, the  region’s  rapid 
growth caught up with the diversification of its trade patterns, and intratrade 
began to increase. 26  Peter A. Petri 
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Fig. 1.3  East Asian interdependence: double-relative 
Still a third story emerges from the double-relative measure (table 1.1 and 
fig. 1.3). This index shows a steady and sharp decline in the regional bias of 
East Asian trade in all but the last five years of data. It also shows that the level 
of interdependence was initially very high, and that it remained high even in 
the initial years after World War 11. By this measure East Asia was more highly 
integrated than either North America or Western Europe both before and after 
the war, and remains so today. Moreover, even the Pacific Rim as a whole, with 
East Asia and North America combined, is more interdependent than Western 
Europe, although its trading bias has diminished somewhat in the 1980s. 
1.3  Determinants of Interdependence 
Bilateral trade patterns and their determinants usually receive little attention 
in the economic analysis of international trade flows. Economists usually chide 
noneconomists for concerning themselves with bilateral or regional trade flows 
when, at least according to some popular theoretical models, bilateral  trade 
flows are analytically uninteresting and even indete~minate.~  Yet the pattern of 
bilateral flows is far from random and exhibits remarkable stability over time. 
It would be difficult to understand this stability without reference to large dif- 
ferences in transaction costs across alternative bilateral linkages. 
The most obvious candidate for explaining the differential intensity of bilat- 
eral linkages is transport cost. Studies of bilateral trade patterns typically show 
that bilateral trade is negatively related to the distance separating the partners5 
4.  For example, the bilateral pattern of  trade is indeterminate in a Heckscher-Ohlin model with 
5.  For example, Linnemann (1966) and Frankel (chap. 2 in this volume) provide clear evidence 
more products than factors, assuming zero transport costs. 
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Yet the strong empirical effect of distance is hard to reconcile with the facts of 
transport technology. Transport costs amount to only a few percentage points 
of  the value of international trade, with much of the cost accounted for in ar- 
ranging for shipment and the loading and unloading of  products (Leontief 
1973). Thus, while transport costs can vary greatly across products and modes 
of transport, they do not vary much with distance itself.6  Nor is there evidence 
that bilateral flows were much affected by  the large fluctuations in transport 
costs that took place, for example, during the oil price shocks of the 1970s. 
So the empirical importance of  distance is most likely due, not to distance 
itself, but to factors correlated with distance. Important among these may be 
human and physical assets that facilitate trade, on both sides of a trading rela- 
tionship. Investments in such assets are more likely to be made among physi- 
cally and culturally proximate trade partners.’ These assets may include knowl- 
edge about the partner’s language, culture, markets, and business practices. 
They may  also include a network of  personal or business relationships and 
business reputations abroad. 
The importance of these factors is underscored by the pervasive role of insti- 
tutions that economize on transactions costs in international trade. Interna- 
tional trade is often intrafirm trade (Lawrence 1991);  it is likely to be mediated 
by  international banks (e.g., through letters of  credit and other instruments 
that enable the firm to shift the risks and information requirements involved in 
international deals to banks); and in many countries it is dominated by  large, 
specialized international trading companies. 
The level of international transactions costs depends in part on past invest- 
ments in physical infrastructure, information, and education. Often, the invest- 
ments required to reduce transactions costs involve substantial scale econo- 
mies,  and  so  transactions  costs  across  a  bilateral  link  will  be  lower  in 
proportion to the activity across the link. For example, it is generally cheaper 
(per unit of output) to establish and operate a transport or telecommunications 
link across a high-density linkage. This is even more true for investments in 
information, which generate an essentially public asset, whose services can be 
costlessly shared by all. Interestingly, the provision of trading information was 
an important early objective of Japanese policies in East Asia, and is among 
the first objectives of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the re- 
gion’s new forum for economic cooperation. 
6. Linnemann (1966) concludes a survey of transport cost data by saying that “one cannot help 
feeling that these magnitudes [of transport costs] (for instance in comparison to prevailing profit 
margins) are in a sense too small to justify  the emphasis on transportation costs as the major 
natural obstacle to international trade.” 
7. In an early empirical study of trade patterns Beckerman (1956) concluded that, “while trans- 
port costs paid (directly or indirectly) by  an Italian entrepreneur on a raw material supplied by 
Turkey may be no greater (as the material may  come by  sea) than  the same material supplied 
by Switzerland, he is more likely to have contacts with Swiss suppliers, since Switzerland will be 
‘nearer’ to him in a psychic evaluation (fewer language difficulties and so on) as well as in the 
economic sense that air travel will absorb less of his time.” 28  Peter A. Petri 
In still other cases, intrabloc transactions costs will be reduced through po- 
litical mechanisms. For example, a free trade agreement will be easier to nego- 
tiate among partners who already have intense linkages. Similarly, the argu- 
ments  for stabilizing an exchange rate  will be  much  more compelling for 
countries with substantial bilateral trade than for those that are not highly inter- 
dependent. Such mechanisms presume, to be sure, that the trade linkage is 
valued highly by all of the bloc’s countries; asymmetric trade, by contrast, may 
not lead to reinforcing agreements even if the (one-way) flow is very intense.* 
The key point is that developments that increase bilateral contacts may trig- 
ger strong, positive feedback effects through their impact on trade-facilitating 
investments. A shock to a bilateral link may be significantly amplified as the 
initial increase in contacts leads to new investments in the bilateral linkage, 
which in turn reduce bilateral transaction costs. In some respects, these mecha- 
nisms are similar to those that generate irreversible changes (“hysteresis”) in 
trade flows in reaction to exchange rate  change^.^ 
The endogeneity of  trade-facilitating investments,  and  thus  transactions 
costs, suggests a simple model of  bloc formation. Suppose that a relatively 
loosely connected group of economies becomes more interdependent due to 
an economic or noneconomic shock. The increased intensity of contacts will 
make it attractive to invest further in the bilateral relationship. Bilateral trans- 
actions costs will fall, leading to further increases in the intensity of the bilat- 
eral relationship. The cycle may repeat itself over time. This story is consistent 
with Europe’s integration process in the 1950s and 1960s. After the war, Euro- 
pean peace and economic recovery increased the importance of European part- 
ners to each other and provided incentives for reducing intra-European trade 
barriers. The Common Market undertook a massive effort to eliminate trade 
barriers and later to reduce the volatility of  European Community exchange 
rates. These steps substantially raised the regional bias of European trade and, 
arguably, resulted in further efforts to reduce intra-European barriers. 
If international transactions costs are endogenous, then history matters. The 
extent to which countries are “shocked” into close trading relationships, and 
the extent to which their periods of rapid growth are parallel, affects their in- 
vestments in their bilateral trade and shapes their subsequent trading relation- 
ships. 
This paper will examine how various historical events have  shaped East 
Asian interdependence. A key piece of the argument is that various “accidents” 
of history-that  is, close international contacts that cannot be traced to market 
8. Petri (1992) argues that strong asymmetries in East Asian trade, including especially the fact 
that many East Asian countries run large trade deficits with Japan and large trade surpluses with 
the United States, explain why purely East Asian trading agreements are unlikely. 
9. Baldwin (1990),  for example, presents a model in which firms establish a “beachhead” (say, 
an export distribution system) in a foreign market after the appreciation of that country’s currency 
and then continue to sell in the market even after the currency depreciates. The argument here 
subsumes such investments, but especially focuses on investments that affect transactions costs in 
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forces alone-have  changed the international pattern of transactions costs and 
have  permanently affected East Asia’s  bilateral trading patterns. Three such 
accidents appear particularly important. First, the imperialist policies of  the 
Western countries established an initial network of  East Asian trade. Later, 
Japanese imperialism provided an impetus for the integration of  East Asia’s 
northern economies. As it was often observed at the time, “trade followed the 
flag.” Finally, the rapid growth of various East Asian countries is now making 
them loom increasingly large to each other and is providing a new impetus for 
regional integration. 
1.4  East Asian Interdependence before 1931 
East Asia has a long history of trade, dating back to Arab and Chinese trade 
among East Asian countries and with Europe. The volume of East Asian trade 
in general, and of East Asian intratrade as well, appears to have gained momen- 
tum with the stepped-up involvement of  European powers in the nineteenth 
century, Subsequently, the expansion of Japan’s economic sphere of influence 
became the main force driving interdependence. 
1.4.1  The Treaty Port System 
Toward the middle of  the nineteenth century, prompted by  British leader- 
ship, a wave of  liberalization spread through Europe. Britain sought similar 
objectives in East Asia: it abolished the monopoly of the East India Company 
and moved aggressively to obtain free access to Chinese markets. The Treaty 
of Nanking, which Britain concluded with China at the end of the Opium War 
of  1840-42,  opened five ports where British subjects could carry on trade 
“without molestation or restraint” and ceded Hong Kong “in perpetuity” to 
Her Majesty. Export and import duties were fixed at an average of 5 percent, 
and consular courts were established to keep British subjects safe from local 
laws. 
As in Europe, Britain also included most favored nation clauses in this and 
other treaties. Thus it  paved  the  way  for  “cooperative” imperialism, with 
France and the United States, and eventually Russia, Prussia, Portugal, Den- 
mark, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, and Italy all signing treaties guarantee- 
ing access to Chinese and other ports (Beasley 1987). 
A surge of trade ensued, both regionally within East Asia, and with Europe. 
The profitability of  this trade led to a lively competition for new ports. The 
United States focused on Japan, and following Matthew C. Perry’s  landings 
eventually concluded a treaty in  1858. Russia, the Netherlands, Britain, and 
France followed with similar treaties of their own. Japan’s early trade thus came 
to be oriented toward the West: silk, tea, and coal were exported to France, 
Italy, and the United States, while textiles, weapons, and machinery were im- 
ported from Britain and the United States. 
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regional trade data become available, the level of East Asian regional interde- 
pendence was already high. As table 1.2 shows, by  1913 about 42 percent of 
the region’s trade was intraregional, compared to 46 percent in  1938 and 47 
percent today. Most of  this trade was mediated by the great ports developed 
by the European powers-Hong  Kong, Manila, Shanghai, and Singapore. In 
addition  to maintaining  bilateral  ties between  the colonies  and their  home 
countries-between  Malaysia and Singapore and England, Indonesia and the 
Netherlands, and the Philippines and the United States-the  ports also played 
a key role in coordinating the trade of  a vast region stretching from India to 
Japan. Roughly 70 percent of Thailand’s trade, for example, was mediated by 
Singapore, which sent some of Thailand’s rice on to China and Japan, in ex- 
change for Indian and British textiles. 
1.4.2  Japanese Expansion 
A second impetus for the intensification of regional ties came from Japan’s 
industrialization and expanding economic influence. By the end of the nine- 
teenth century Japan had established a role parallel to or surpassing those of 
other powers in Korea and China. It continued to gain economic and military 
power in the early twentieth century, and began to displace the exports of Euro- 
pean powers in their own colonies. 
Japan’s role in the treaty port system quickly changed from host to protago- 
nist. By 1876 Japan had itself opened three Korean ports and began competing 
aggressively with China to reexport Western textiles to Korea. In 1895 Japan 
won  a major military victory over China, gaining a large indemnity, further 
influence in Korea, commercial privileges in China, and two important territor- 
ies: the Liaotung Peninsula  (including Dalien, Manchuria’s most  important 
port) and Taiwan. Japan was eventually forced to back down on the Liaotung 
claims, but its victory had clearly established it as a rising imperial power. 
Table 1.2  East Asian Trade as Share of Total Trade for Different Countries 
(exports plus imports) 










Excluding Korea, Taiwan 
Excluding Korea, Taiwan, Japan 
0.53  0.46  0.70  0.43  0.59 
0.32  0.38  0.26  0.32  0.60 
0.99  0.50  0.42 
0.4 1  0.47  0.70  0.22  0.29 
1 .oo  0.35  0.40 
0.44  0.39  0.35  0.30  0.37 
0.18  0.15  0.11  0.17  0.43 
0.62  0.71  0.65  0.52  0.5  1 
0.42  0.43  0.59  0.35  0.45 
0.42  0.43  0.46  0.33  0.47 
0.42  0.42  0.41  0.35  0.50 
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Scholars tend to agree that the conquest of Korea reflected primarily mili- 
tary, rather than economic, objectives-as  the Japanese army’s Prussian advi- 
sor put it, Korea was “a dagger thrust at the heart of Japan” (Myers and Peattie 
1984, 15). But the economic potential  of a broader sphere of influence was 
not lost on the Meiji leadership. Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro explicitly 
recognized the importance of economic  objectives and their relationship to 
military power. 
Competition through commercial and industrial activity and through over- 
seas enterprises is a phenomenon of grave importance in recent international 
relations. . . . [Western  countries]  have  been  zealous  in  expanding  their 
rights in mining, or in railroads, or in internal waterways, and in various 
other directions on the Asian continents, especially in China. . . . However, 
when we look at the measures [taken by] our own empire, which has the 
most important ties of interest in the area, separated by  only a thin stretch 
of water, there is not much to be seen yet. Both those in government  and 
those outside it regard this as highly regrettable. (Duus 1984, 133) 
In any case, Japan’s military triumphs in Korea were quickly followed by 
investments  in  communications  infrastructure  related to bilateral trade, and 
eventually modifications in the Taiwanese and Korean economies that helped 
to make them more complementary to the Japanese economy. Meiji-style ag- 
ricultural  reforms, such as comprehensive land surveys, were introduced, es- 
tablishing clear criteria for the ownership and taxation of land and facilitating 
the sale of  land.1° A combination of  these administrative measures and new 
agricultural technologies imported from Japan resulted in a dramatic surge of 
agricultural production.” By the late 1920s Korea and Taiwan supplied 80 per- 
cent of Japan’s rice imports,’2 two-thirds of its sugar, and substantial shares of 
other minerals and lumber (Peattie 1984, 32). 
But it was China that was regarded as the great prize. In 1905 Japan defeated 
Russia in Manchuria and acquired control over the Liaotung Peninsula (known 
as the Kwantung Leased Territory), all of Korea, the southern half of Sakhalin 
Island (Karafuto), and the Chinese Eastern Railway. There followed a substan- 
tial wave of investments in communications, coordinated by the Southern Man- 
churia Railway Company (SMR), a quasi-public company that remained a key 
player also in later phases of Japanese expansion. A key objective of the com- 
pany was to shape the transport infrastructure of Manchuria-that  is, to ensure 
10. According to  some historians, the  land  surveys  made  it easier for Japanese investors to 
acquire land from Korean and Taiwanese owners. 
11. Colonial farmers did not benefit, however; despite substantial growth in output, per capita 
rice consumption was essentially flat in both Korea and Taiwan in the 1920s and declined substan- 
tially in the 1930s (Ho 1984, 379). 
12. In  light of the considerable current emphasis on full self-sufficiency in rice, it is interesting 
to note that Japan depended extensively on rice imports during much of the prewar period, gener- 
ally importing 20 percent of its requirements. 32  Peter A. Petri 
that the network fed into Dalien, the Japanese-controlled port (Beasley 1987, 
The Japanese government also moved aggressively to improve information 
on the Chinese economy. The Ministry of  Finance proposed a wide-ranging 
study of Chinese demand, exhibitions in treaty ports, visits by Japanese entre- 
preneurs, and new ways of disseminating information, including a China Asso- 
ciation in Japan that would encourage businessmen to take interest in China. 
The minister of  agriculture and commerce (the precursor of the modern-day 
MITI) provided  a particularly  eloquent argument  for investments in  infor- 
mation. 
90-92). 
There was a time when Japan hoped to find her chief field of commercial 
enterprise in the west; but today the mind of Japan is all toward China as the 
commercial hope of our future, not to say anything of our geographical and 
racial advantages with that country. It is our ambition to be to the East what 
Great Britain is to the West. We have left no means untried  in making a 
thorough investigation of the present conditions of China. . . . We think we 
know a good deal about commercial conditions in China because we know 
a little more than the merchants of the West; but we really know nothing as 
we ought to know; and I would advise all those who hope to share in trade 
with China, to make careful and constant investigation into the conditions 
prevailing there; for I am sure there is much yet to be learned, if our trade 
with China is to achieve its best. Instead of  our business men staying at 
home and waiting for orders, let them go or send representatives into central 
China, and they will find a more remunerative field of demand and consump- 
tion than they ever dreamed of, reclining in their offices at home. (Whelpley 
1913,247-48). 
But as Japan became good at imperialism, the Western powers began to 
change the rules of the game. The powers started to relax their control over 
their colonies by revising the treaties on foreign ports; soon after World War I, 
for example, China was granted substantial tariff autonomy. At the same time, 
powers moved to control Japan’s growing regional influence. The Washington 
Conference in 1921 sharply limited the size of the Japanese navy, and a period 
of economic and political frictions ensued. 
Despite the strained political circumstances, the sphere of influence estab- 
lished at the turn of the century resulted in a sharp increase in Japan’s regional 
economic role. By the late 1920s Japan had essentially caught up with Western 
interests in China, and by  1931 the stock of  Japanese investments in China 
equalled those of Great Britain and exceeded those of all other countries com- 
bined (Beasley 1987, 133). Japanese investments reached deep into Manchu- 
ria; for example, by  the end of World War I, the Hanyehping Coal and Iron 
Company supplied 60 percent of Yawata Steel’s iron ore requirements (Beasley 
1987, 137). This period of the so-called Shidehara diplomacy was character- 
ized by frequent Japanese-Western clashes, repeated concessions on both mili- 
tary and trade rights, yet considerable economic gains. 33  The East Asian Trading Bloc: An Analytical History 
1.5  Interdependence between 1931 and 1945 
The era of  political compromise ended in  1931. This turn of  events was 
hastened by Chinese resistance to Japan’s economic advance and by  world de- 
pression. Subsequently, Japan’s economic strategy dramatically changed. The 
colonial-style exchange of manufactures for raw materials gave way to a con- 
certed effort to develop independent bases of industrial strength in several parts 
of Japan’s economic empire. The new strategy led to substantial industrial in- 
vestments outside Japan proper, and eventually gave rise to increasingly so- 
phisticated economic linkages among Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and eventually 
China. 
1.5.1  Military Expansion 
Three factors helped to replace the economic approaches of the 1920s with 
a strategy based on military power. The first was China’s emerging nationalism. 
By the late 1920s Japan’s influence in China came under increased threat from 
the Kuomintang. In  1927, for example, the northern Chinese warlord Chang 
Tso-lin, under Kuomintang influence, withdrew permission for the construc- 
tion of five new Japanese railway lines into northern Manchuria. A year later, 
Chiang Kai-shek defeated his Beijing rivals and set his sights on the north 
Chinese provinces dominated by  Japan. Japan’s  Kwantung Army responded 
with a complex series of intrigues that eventually led to the invasion of Man- 
churia in 1931 (Barnhart 1987). 
A second factor involved trade frictions that increasingly limited Japan’s 
conventional access to international markets. As the world economy began to 
decline starting in  1929, Japan’s  trade relations sharply deteriorated, since 
many trade partners blamed Japan for the particularly large gains that it had 
achieved during the previous decade. For example, by  1932 Japan had dis- 
placed the Netherlands as Indonesia’s largest trade partner, and had made simi- 
lar inroads in Malaysia. During the 1930s Japan became embroiled in one trade 
dispute after another; conflicts with India, the Dutch East Indies, and Canada 
each resulted in a trade war or reciprocal boycott. As one contemporary writer 
put it, it was 
the bad fortune of the Island Empire that it has come of age industrially at a 
time when economic theory and, still more, economic practice have drifted 
far away from the ideals of  Bright and Cobden.. . . [Its] export trade has 
been considerably retarded by  a multitude of  economic barbed-wire en- 
tanglements in the shape of quota restrictions, high tariffs, and other mea- 
sures designed to check the sweep of “Made in Japan” products. . . . More 
than sixty countries have imposed special restrictions on Japanese textiles; 
less than thirty have left the door open on equal terms. (Chamberlin 1937, 
219) 
The final factor that pushed Japan toward a military strategy was a severe 
agricultural recession. Policies designed to generate rice surpluses in Taiwan 34  Peter A. Petri 
and Korea coincided with worldwide commodity deflation. As rice prices fell, 
conditions  in  Japanese  agriculture  worsened,  and  the  government  rapidly 
shifted its colonial investments toward industry. 
In any case, the 193  1 invasion of Manchuria, like previous Japanese colonial 
moves, was followed by a large wave of public and private investments. But 
there was little room in this picture for non-Japanese companies; by the early 
1930s Anglo-Dutch  Petroleum, Standard Oil,  Siemens, and  Skoda had  all 
liquidated major interests (Jones 1949). Manchuria, Korea, and to a lesser ex- 
tent Taiwan became thoroughly transformed. In the meantime, the complemen- 
tarity of the Manchurian, Korean, and Japanese economies came to be based 
on manufacturing;  Nissan,  for example, a manufacturer  of  armaments,  air- 
planes,  automobiles,  and machinery, moved its headquarters  to Changchun, 
and its president eventually went on to direct the Manchuria Industrial Devel- 
opment Company  (MIDC; Jones  1949). Manchuria was to become a self- 
sufficient industrial base, supplying basic materials, including coal, iron and 
steel, electricity and synthetic oil, rolling stock, and ships to itself and Japan 
in exchange for machinery (Beasley 1987,216). 
Toward the end of the 1930s Japan’s expansion into China became increas- 
ingly ominous and continued to accelerate.  In  1937 a minor clash between 
Chinese and Japanese troops provided a pretext for capturing  Nanking and 
much of the Yangtze valley. Soon afterward, Prime Minister Konoe announced 
a “new order” that called for close cooperation (“coprosperity”) among China, 
Japan, and Manchuria. 
A broaa southern advance also began to emerge as part of Japan’s increas- 
ingly expansionist strategy. In  1939 the Showa Research Institute developed 
an extensive plan for an East Asian Economic Bloc (Lebra  1975, 100-103), 
which would be  self-sufficient by  relying  on tin, rubber, bauxite, tungsten, 
nickel, and chromium from Thailand, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, 
and Malaya (Beasley 1987, 225). 
As World War I1 approached, the scope of Japan’s sphere of influence was 
expanded  to  include  Indochina  in  the  so-called  Greater  East  Asia  Co- 
prosperity Sphere (GEACS). In the event, not much economic integration took 
place during the GEACS period, aside from the diversion of some raw materi- 
als to Japan, because the sea-lanes were not safe enough to permit large-scale 
transport. Instead, the region suffered a deep economic decline as its trade with 
the West collapsed. 
1.5.2  Legacies and Parallels 
Japan’s role in the prewar economy substantially increased East Asian inter- 
dependence, particularly among China, Korea, Taiwan, and Japan in the 1930s. 
Japan’s activities in these countries focused on developing transport infrastruc- 
ture and information, and in the end on developing complementarities with the 
Japanese economy. The result, naturally enough, was a surge in Japan’s re- 
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Fig. 1.4  Partner composition of Japanese exports (five-year  moving averages) 
Southeast Asia, but the economic connections between this region and Japan 
were brief and overshadowed by the imperatives of war. The Japanese occupa- 
tion, however, did drive European colonial governments from Southeast Asia 
and laid the foundations for independence after the war. Thus the economic 
links that emerged after the war were more Asian than before. 
Japan’s intense style of imperialism has left long-lived legacies. Unlike the 
European imperialist powers, Japan was close to its colonies and, in Korea and 
Manchuria, had excellent communications with them through rail transport. 
Also, because it was concerned not only with the economic exploitation of the 
colonies but also with their role as buffers against Russian and Western forces, 
Japan developed dense political and military organizations to control its em- 
pire. Finally, given rice exports as a key early objective, Japan could not restrict 
its economic activities to an “enclave,” but was forced to penetrate local eco- 
nomic structures (Ho 1984,385). 
By the early 1930s Japan’s style of complementarity differed dramatically 
from that of other colonial powers; as Cumings (1984,482) has observed, Japa- 
nese imperialism “involved the location of  industry and an infrastructure of 
communications and transportation in  the colonies, bringing industry to the 
labor and raw materials, rather than vice-versa.’’ Although the linkage between 
the Japanese occupation and the subsequent spectacular development of Man- 
churia, Korea, and Taiwan is extremely controversial, there is no doubt that 
powerful industrial centers developed in each of  these areas and that these 
centers evolved along the same technological lines as Japan’s own industries. 
The notion of a large regional bloc that would also include Southeast Asia 
does not appear to have been a part of Japan’s strategy until 1939. Prime Minis- 
ter  Konoe’s  1938 announcement made  no mention  of  southern areas, and 
the inclusion of Southeast Asia did not arise until the fall of France. By that 36  Peter A. Petri 
time, GEACS was clearly designed to obtain raw materials needed for war. As 
Peattie has argued, GEACS is best  seen as a response to a “sudden turn in 
international  events .  . . rather  than the consequence  of  long-considered  or 
widely-held interest in the co-prosperity of Asian peoples” (1991,42). 
1.6  Interdependence from World War I1 to 1985 
As table  1.1 and figure  1.4 show, World War I1  thoroughly disrupted the 
trade patterns established in the prewar years. Trade flows shifted toward the 
United States, now the leading military power in the Pacific and the only coun- 
try with its economy largely intact. Linkages between Japan and Taiwan and 
Korea were sharply curtailed. China’s trade also collapsed as the country sank 
into civil war. Insurrections erupted also in Indonesia, Indochina, and Malay- 
sia. As a result, trade flows declined sharply throughout the Pacific, especially 
among China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, the “core” countries of GEACS. 
Postwar U.S. policy recognized that this sharp dislocation in trade patterns 
would undermine the prospects for economic recovery in all of the countries 
that once formed the Japanese empire. The influential Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions, for example, concluded at its  1947 conference on the reconstruction of 
East Asia that, for the sake of Japan and the rest of the region, “Japan must be 
actively helped to regain something of  her old position as the mainspring of 
the Far Eastern economy  as a whole”  (Institute of Pacific Relations,  1949). 
The U.S. occupation authorities in turn began to use the leverage provided by 
their influence over aid and Japanese reparations to China, Korea, and Taiwan, 
as well as in Southeast Asia, to revive these countries’ trade with Japan. 
The data show the magnitude of this challenge. Japan’s two-way trade with 
East Asia fell from 73 percent of her trade around 1940 to only about 3  1 per- 
cent in  1951. At the same time, the partner composition of this East Asian 
trade shifted from the “core” economies of  GEACS to Southeast Asia. The 
decline in the importance of East Asian countries in general, and of the core 
partners in particular, can be traced almost entirely to the general decline of 
their economies, rather than to a decline in their special gravitational linkages 
with Japan. The analysis of  gravity coefficients suggests that regional biases 
within East Asian trade remained at essentially the same high level in 1955 as 
they were in 1938. While East Asian linkages remained strong, they were now 
driven, not by Japanese policy, but by economic structures inherited form the 
prewar period  and by U.S. policies  designed to restart  this group of highly 
interdependent economies. 
The subsequent story of East Asian economic growth is well known and has 
been recently reviewed by Kuznets (1988), Noland (1990), Wade (1990), and 
others. What is of interest here is that the spectacular growth of the region’s 
economies was accompanied by a substantial decline in their regional trade 
bias. As shown in table 1.3, the gravity coefficients of East Asian trade-coef- 
ficients that summarize each country’s bias toward East Asian trade partners- 37  The East Asian Trading Bloc: An Analytical History 
Table 1.3  Intensity of the East Asian Trade Linkages of Different Countries 
and Regions (gravity coefficient measure) 
1938  1955  1969  1979  1985  1990 
Japan 
North America 
















4.66  3.13  2.07  2.02  1.46  1  SO 
0.92  1.16  1.48  1.53  1.48  1.44 
0.53  1.35  2.70  2.85  2.24  2.11 
6.63  7.15  4.83  2.82  1.72  2.14 
6.68  4.92  4.83  2.91  1.96  2.04 
3.96  7.55  3.72  3.22  3.09  2.96 
2.31  4.22  3.34  3.11  2.05  1.88 
4.34  7.36  5.38  3.64  2.69  2.61 
0.70  2.45  4.58  3.17  2.54  2.22 
1.76  4.60  5.52  4.89  3.34  3.10 
4.70  6.13  2.91  2.76  3.23  3.04 
0.26  0.49  0.33  0.34  0.31  0.36 
0.46  1.05  1.39  1.84  1.36  1.33 
0.30  0.67  0.8 1  0.62  0.70  0.76 
1  .oo  1  .oo  1 .oo  1  .oo  1  .oo  1  .oo 
4.48  4.45  2.97  2.64  2.05  2.09 
2.61  1.95  2.05  2.08  1.77  1.80 
2.72  3.51  2.93  2.44  1.94  1.91 
which survived World War  I1 at relatively high levels, fell steadily in the fol- 
lowing years. The pattern of decline is similar for most East Asian countries, 
and the few anomalies that do occur (an unusually rapid decline in the case of 
China, and an unusual increase in the case of  the Philippines) can be under- 
stood in terms of major political changes in the countries involved. 
Equally remarkable is a parallel decline in the dispersion of gravity coeffi- 
cients (that is, in variations in the intensity of linkages across different trade 
partners) in the region. As shown in table 1.4, the standard deviations of the 
gravity coefficients of most East Asian countries fell steadily during the post- 
war period. In effect, each country’s bilateral trade pattern came to look more 
and more like the world’s trade pattern-the  importance of any particular part- 
ner to a given country came to resemble the importance of that partner in world 
trade as a whole. (If each partner’s share of  a country’s trade were equal to 
that partner’s share in world trade, then all gravity coefficients would be one.) 
Country-specific  biases became less and less important in explaining the distri- 
bution of  East Asian trade, both between East Asia  and other regions and 
across different East Asian partners. 
Three types of  factors help to explain the diversification and homogeniza- 
tion of  the region’s trade. The first was the general integration of  the global 
economy during most of  the postwar period, which was spurred by  several 
successful rounds of trade negotiations, steady progress toward convertibility, 
and considerable improvements in  international communications and trans- 
port. All of these factors worked to pull East Asia’s trade (as well as the trade 38  Peter A. Petri 
Table 1.4  Dispersion of Gravity Coefficients, by Country and over Time 
(standard deviations of gravity coefficients) 
1938  1955  1969  1979  1985  1990 
Japan 
North America 
















5.55  4.25  2.50  1.75  1.26  1.22 
1.41  0.85  0.62  0.50  0.55  0.47 
0.6.5  0.66  0.94  1.19  0.97  1.23 
4.08  4.5 1  2.60  1.53  1.07  1.13 
4.18  5.45  2.01  1.19  0.91  0.97 
6.8 1  10.22  2.79  2.61  3.36  4.02 
9.25  4.21  3.78  2.74  1.95  1.24 
9.59  4.92  3.14  2.18  1.80  1.26 
I .52  1.42  1.96  1.19  1.23  0.86 
3.11  3.53  3.45  2.58  1.49  1.30 
6.15  9.5  I  2.77  2.57  3.47  4.09 
0.56  0.43  0.33  0.32  0.36  0.33 
1.12  0.68  0.74  0.63  0.41  0.49 
0.41  0.38  0.58  0.48  0.37  0.37 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
2.28  2.52  1.68  1.15  0.88  0.80 
0.97  0.76  0.77  0.64  0.49  0.46 
3.39  3.19  1.80  1.37  1.21  1.19 
of  all other countries) away  from its regional partners  toward  more global 
sources and destinations. 
A second important factor was the rapid development of the region’s econo- 
mies. The expansion of each economy’s overall trade provided the scale needed 
to justify investments in trading linkages with an increasingly large number of 
countries. More frequent shipping and air schedules could now be maintained; 
additional investments could be made in communications; and a greater stock 
of information could be developed to link firms and their foreign counterparts. 
All these trends undoubtedly contributed to the broadening of East Asian mar- 
keting efforts. These trends presumably operated in all countries, but it is likely 
that their effect was especially pronounced in the context of East Asia’s “mir- 
acle” economies. 
A third factor driving East Asia’s  diversification was the similarity of East 
Asian development patterns. Each country rapidly shifted its output from raw 
materials  to manufactures, and within  manufactures from labor-intensive  to 
more capital- and technology-intensive sectors. These patterns have been de- 
scribed as the “flying geese pattern” of development by  the Japanese econo- 
mists (Akamatsu 1960) and are consistent with Heckscher-Ohlin explanations 
of how trade patterns are likely to change with the accumulation of human and 
physical capital.I3 
13. A case can he made that East Asian development trajectories are more similar than would 
be justified by  Heckscher-Ohlin considerations because they “follow” a common East Asian de- 39  The East Asian Trading Bloc: An Analytical History 
The similarity in development patterns is important for two reasons. First, it 
explains how  each country acquired an increasingly sophisticated basket of 
exports and thus positioned itself to compete in a wider world market. Second, 
it explains why East Asian countries developed competitive rather than com- 
plementary economies, and thus why they had to look to outside markets, 
rather than regional markets, for new trading opportunities. 
An important exception of this story involves linkages based on the importa- 
tion of intermediate inputs and capital goods. The commonality of East Asian 
development trajectories has meant that each country would typically look to 
neighboring countries for appropriate technology. These supply-side linkages 
in turn gave rise to substantial imports of  machinery and components. As  a 
result, several East Asian economies acquired asymmetrical linkages. On the 
one hand, they relied heavily on the region’s  more advanced economies- 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore-for  imports of machinery and components, 
and on the other, they looked outside the region to sell their exports. 
1.7  Interdependence Today 
The intensity of  East Asian  interdependence appears to have  reached a 
trough in  1985-86.  The turning point came at the end of  a period when the 
real value of the U.S. dollar was unusually high; in the preceding years, several 
East Asian countries had sharply shifted their trade toward the United States. 
In addition, the high value of the dollar permitted Japanese companies to main- 
tain their exports despite sharply higher wages and declining competitiveness 
against other East Asian economies. 
The large exchange rate adjustments of  1985 and 1986 affected interdepen- 
dence in a complex way. Initially, the appreciation of the yen was not matched 
by other East Asian currencies; thus other countries became more competitive 
against Japan in both U.S. and Japanese markets. For a while, East Asian im- 
ports surged in both markets, and Korea, Taiwan, and other countries began to 
run substantial trade surpluses. These export surges also led to accelerating 
imports from Japan and Singapore. As  a result, East Asian interdependence 
intensified; intraregional trade expanded very rapidly, and the long-run decline 
of the region’s gravity coefficients ceased. 
Many observers assumed at that time that the trade flow adjustments de- 
scribed above represented the beginning of a new historical trend toward the 
velopment model, as pioneered by Japan. This case is most easily made for Korea, which systemat- 
ically researched and adopted Japanese policies during its high-growth period. Petri (1988) has 
shown that the composition of  Korean industry resembles the composition of Japanese industry 
more closely than would be expected on the basis of resource similarities alone. These similarities 
are in part due to the similarity of  external opportunities; for example, the dynamics of foreign 
protection systematically “capped import surges from Japan and thus created systematic incen- 
tives for Korean producers to move into the same industries in which Japan excelled. 40  Peter A. Petri 
greater integration of the East Asian economy. This may still be the case, but 
the events of  1985-88 were in large part driven by the staggered adjustment of 
exchange rates in different East Asian countries. By the late 1980s the second 
phase of the exchange rate adjustments took hold, as most of the region’s cur- 
rencies appreciated to close the gap that had opened between them and the yen 
in the mid- 1980s. These corrections slowed the surge of Japanese imports from 
East Asia and stopped the increase in the region’s gravity coefficients. To be 
sure, the absolute volume of East Asian trade continued to expand at a rapid 
pace due to the high growth of the region’s economies. 
The more significant impact of the appreciation of the yen was a sharp in- 
crease in regional  investment  flows (see table  1.5). Malaysia, Thailand, and 
Indonesia had two-thirds as much investment in 1988-89  alone as in all previ- 
ous years until then. The cause of this wave is widely accepted; the exchange 
rate changes of the late 1980s reduced the competitiveness of Japanese firms 
and led firms to shift some production activities closer to markets and to coun- 
tries with  lower labor costs. While most  of  these investments  went  into the 
United  States and other developed countries, a substantial  amount also oc- 
curred in East Asia. 
Table 1.5  Foreign Direct Investment in East Asia (millions of US.  dollars) 
HosUSource  Total  Japan  U.S.  Korea  Taiwan  Hong Kong  Singapore 
Thailand 
Up to 1987 
1988-89 
Up to 1987 
1988-89 
Up to 1987 
1988-89 
Philippines 
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3,648  1,857  876 
4,170  1.343  1.25 I 
Singapore 
Sum (Thailand, 
1984-88  6,529 
Malaysia, Indonesia 
only) 
Up to 1987  33,020 
1988-89  22,717 
1987  1.000 
1988-89  I .ooo 
Shares of sum 









3,356  231 
1,532  843 
0.3  16 
0.295 
0.102  0.007 
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By the late 1980s, as the newly industrializing countries (NICs) also ad- 
justed their exchange rates and began to face competitive strains similar to 
Japan’s, they too joined Japan as major investors in East Asia. Thus an entirely 
new channel of interdependence began to operate: cross-investments among a 
large number of  East Asian countries. This is a natural result of  the region’s 
prosperity; it recalls patterns of integration that have evolved in Europe. 
The investment wave of the late 1980s differed from earlier investments in 
developing country production facilities not just in magnitude and origin, but 
also in structure. Japan’s investments in East Asia in the 1970s, for example, 
were primarily focused on local markets, often encouraged by  policies that 
sought to increase local participation in industry, for example, through the im- 
portation  of  automobile kits instead of  assembled automobiles. The recent 
wave of  investments, by  contrast, is the product of  new,  global strategies by 
regional firms. Nearly all firms have adopted such strategies, and some have 
gone to some length to plan a comprehensive distribution of  their activities 
across different regional markets. Toyota, for example, has selected locations 
that will permit it to build a regional automobile, with components produced 
in different countries, depending on the advantages of the location in terms of 
supplier infrastructure and local resources (fig. 1.5). 
Since the recent investment wave  has been driven by  production strategy 
rather than by market considerations, it has included a larger share of export- 
oriented industries. More so than in the past, the firms established in foreign 
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locations have also been intended to serve home (e.g., Japanese) markets. At 
the same time, since these investments were closely tied to Japanese technolog- 
ies and suppliers that have remained at home, they have typically required a 
higher ratio of imported inputs than earlier investments. Because of these char- 
acteristics, the recent wave of intra-East  Asian investment flows has helped to 
intensify regional linkages by facilitating exports into Japan and other regional 
markets and by  spreading technologies that require regional inputs and capi- 
tal goods. 
The market forces that have helped to intensify regional linkages through 
trade and investment have been also supported by  government aid policies. 
Japn’s aid program has been always oriented toward Asia, but its growing 
scale has made it an important factor in recent economic linkages. Japanese 
aid flows to East Asia have been substantial compared to private investment 
flaws. These flows have helped to finance the infrastructure that supports pri- 
vate investment. 
The volume of  intraregional investment has slackened somewhat recently 
but is likely to remain relatively high compared to historical levels. Some of 
the reasons for the current slowdown are permanent: the investment wave of 
late  1980s represented, in part, a onetime adjustment in corporate sourcing 
policies, triggered by  the appreciation of  the yen  and the NICs’ currencies. 
But other reasons are temporary. As a result of  the rapid inflow of  capital, 
infrastructure bottlenecks developed in several of the receiving economies, in- 
cluding especially Thailand, and labor and real estate costs rose sharply due to 
the overheated economy. At the same time, the accumulation of Japanese firms 
has contributed to the development of an economic infrastructure-consisting 
of suppliers and service companies-that  will make it easier for other firms to 
invest in the future. 
1.8  Policy Reactions 
Postwar trends in East Asian interdependence have been driven by  market 
rather than political forces. These forces initially worked to diversify the re- 
gion’s trade, as the growing scale of the region’s  economies permitted more 
diversified links, and as the region’s competitive development strategies forced 
each country to look for markets outside the East Asian region. But even as 
the intensity of the region’s trade declined, its volume dramatically increased. 
Over the past two decades, East Asia’s share in world trade doubled, and even 
in the face of declining regional intensity, this meant that East Asia’s internal 
trade increased from 30 to 41 percent of its total trade. 
The importance of a particular partner in a country’s transactions is likely to 
be closely related to the country’s investments in linkages with that partner. It 
is thus not  surprising that a wide array of  regional initiatives have  recently 
emerged to address the new issues generated by East Asian interdependence. 
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reduce transactions costs in regional trade, manage intraregional trade fric- 
tions, and marshal regional economic forces against external economic chal- 
lenges. 
The institutions that are emerging from these initiatives are still very much 
in flux. But to the extent that they manage to accomplish the objectives cited, 
they will further encourage intraregional transactions. In the pattern of Euro- 
pean and North American interdependence, private sector trends and policies 
designed to accommodate these trends may lead to reinforcing political mecha- 
nisms that encourage interdependence. 
The development of  regional institutions is complicated both by  the great 
diversity of the region’s countries and by the preference of many of the region’s 
countries for informal, negotiated (as opposed to formal, legalistic) approaches 
to policy. Regional trade policies range widely from the virtual absence of 
trade barriers in Hong Kong and Singapore, to the relatively liberal regimes of 
Malaysia and Thailand, the intermediate and more opaque regimes of  Korea, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines, and the still extensive protection in China. The 
picture is further complicated by the fact that some highly outward countries- 
for example, Korea and Thailand-still  use protection to promote infant indus- 
tries and exports. And even countries that have little formal protection, such as 
Japan, have policy and business structures that are difficult to penetrate. 
Regional  cooperation  is  also  tempered  by  the  “style”  of  East  Asian 
policymaking. At the risk of excessive generalization, many East Asian coun- 
tries pursue informal and relatively opaque approaches to policy. Relationships 
among businesses and between business and government are often character- 
ized by  long-term collaboration, reciprocal favors, and continuous negotia- 
tions, rather than market-mediated transactions and explicit contracts. Most 
East Asian governments, even in countries with modest trade barriers, actively 
participate in the management of the economy and administer complex arrays 
of incentives and barriers (Arndt 1987).  Bureaucrats and influential industrial- 
ists have high stakes in maintaining this system of intervention and thus prefer 
to respond to new policy challenges with administrative instruments such as 
VERs, VEIs, and regulatory interventions. 
In  this context cooperation on a modest, practical level has proved more 
possible than  the  development of  large-scale agreements and  institutions. 
Small, local free trade areas (especially the Shenzhen Free Trade Zone and the 
Singapore growth triangle) are especially well suited to this policy setting and 
appear to be developing very fast. In what follows, each of the region’s coopera- 
tive structures is reviewed in the context of  its history and likely evolution, 
moving from the least to the most comprehensive. 
Mini-Trading  Areas  (MTAs). Though not unique to East Asia, international 
trading schemes involving small geographical areas of  two or more countries 
have multiplied. These areas feature special provisions to exempt international 
trade from national tariffs until the products leave the MTA, as well as trans- 44  Peter A. Petri 
portation and other infrastructure to support international trade and investment. 
The oldest and perhaps most successful such area is the Shenzhen Free Trade 
Zone, which forms a bridge between Guangdong Province and Hong Kong. A 
new initiative along these lines is the “growth triangle” formed by Singapore, 
Johore province of  Malaysia, and Batam Island of  Indonesia. Similar zones 
have been proposed to link (1) China, the Koreas, eastern Siberia, and western 
Japan (North-East Asia Economic Cooperation); (2) Japan, China up to Liaon- 
ing, and Korea (Yellow Sea Cooperation); (3) Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China 
south of Shanghai (Southern China Economic Cooperation); (4) Hong Kong, 
Guangdong,  Guangxi,  northern  Thailand,  Laos,  and  Vietnam  (Tongking- 
Mekong Economic Cooperation); (5)  Thailand, Cambodia, and southern Viet- 
nam (Southern Indochina Economic Cooperation);  (6) Myanmar, Thailand, 
and Indochina (Souvannaphoum); and (7) Thailand, northern Sumatra, and 
northern Malaysia (ITM N~xus).’~ 
Not all of these MTAs will get off the ground, but the proliferation of the 
idea is interesting. MTAs fit the region’s pragmatic approach to policy, and 
especially its reluctance to adopt more complex agreements than warranted by 
immediate economic needs. Such pragmatism is likely to be especially helpful 
in cooperations with the formerly socialist economies, which may not have the 
institutions to offer credible large-scale agreements for some time to come. So 
MTAs offer a potentially important model for linking China, Russia, Indo- 
china, and North Korea with East Asia’s market economies. 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  This association, comprising 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore, was 
initially focused on political and security issues. Due to competing industrial 
objectives, the organization made little progress toward integrating the region’s 
economies until recently. A Preferential Trade Area Agreement was signed in 
1977, but the proportion of  trade covered by  this agreement has remained 
small. As the association’s economies came to pursue more liberal economic 
strategies, however, the possibilities for regional cooperation improved. 
In February 1992 ASEAN adopted an ambitious program to establish a free 
trade area in fifteen years. Some tariffs have already been lowered with this 
objective in mind. But ASEAN’s internal trade is modest, and the great similar- 
ity of ASEAN’s economies (Brunei and Singapore aside) raises the possibility 
of substantial trade diversion within an ASEAN free trade area, particularly if 
external tariffs remain high. Against this, the opportunity to serve a larger re- 
gional market may improve prospects for attracting large-scale foreign invest- 
ment. Overall, ASEAN’s political divisions and the doubtful economic merits 
of the free trade area will tend to limit the influence of ASEAN in the region’s 
institutional framework. 
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East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC).  In late 1990, with the Uruguay Round 
negotiations heading for stalemate, President Mahathir of Malaysia called for 
the formation of an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), consisting of Japan, 
the East Asian NICs, China, and the remaining ASEAN countries. Perhaps the 
plan emerged in President Mahathir’s mind as a natural extension of his “Look 
East” program, which aimed to shift Malaysia’s economic perspectives closer 
to the development models of Japan and Korea. Although the objectives of the 
EAEG were not spelled out, it appeared to create an alliance of  East Asian 
states to counter emerging blocs in Europe and the Western Hemisphere. The 
plan was strongly opposed by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, 
because it was viewed as undermining the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), the emerging OECD-like institution that includes countries from both 
sides of the Pacific (see below). Japan also publicly opposed the plan, but some 
Japanese government officials and senior business executives were more posi- 
tive in private statements. 
The opposition of  the United States and the lack of  a clear agenda for 
the EAEG(roup) eventually led President Mahathir to recast the idea as an 
EAEC(aucus). The concept now calls for periodic consultations among East 
Asian states-a  mission no clearer than that of the EAEG. Three interpreta- 
tions are possible. First, the EAEC may be a face-saving device for abandoning 
the EAEG idea. Second, the EAEC may be represent a threat against exclusion- 
ist U.S. and European policies. Third, the EAEC could be a step toward accel- 
erating the integration of East Asian economies by promoting the coordination 
of their policies. Given the conflicting styles of East Asian and Anglo-Saxon 
policymaking, the EAEC may be better suited for this purpose than a broader 
group such as the APEC, which also includes Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Asia Pacijic Economic  Cooperation (APEC). The idea of  forming a Pacific 
region-wide  organization has been pursued for several decades through infor- 
mal, quasi-private organizations such as the Pacific Basin Economic Confer- 
ence (PBEC), Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), and Pacific As- 
sociation for Trade and Development (PAFTAD).  Since 1989, however, the 
foreign ministers of twelve Pacific Rim countries-Australia,  Brunei, Canada, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and the United States-agreed  to meet annually to review issues of 
mutual interest. APEC’s  initial work program consisted of  a series of  tasks, 
managed by member countries, on cooperation in areas such as the collection 
of trade and investment data, and the analysis of  policies in sectors such as 
energy, tourism, transportation, and fisheries. At its 1991 meeting APEC also 
established a modest secretariat. 
APEC’s mission is still evolving. The organization has been most comfort- 
able with tasks involving technical cooperation and information exchange. Its 
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China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong to APEC membership. Beyond this, APEC 
meetings have dealt with noncontroversial  issues such as support for intema- 
tional trade liberalization through the Uruguay Round. It remains to be seen 
whether  APEC  can  assume  functions  beyond  the  technical,  for example, 
whether it can facilitate movement toward regional liberalization, the harmoni- 
zation of regulations, or the resolution of trade frictions. APEC’s membership 
is very diverse, and few members  seem willing to trust this new institution 
with significant responsibilities. 
1.9  Conclusions 
This paper has explored the hypothesis that blocs are, in part, the product 
of historical accidents. Reinforcing mechanisms of integration can be set into 
motion by military force or other developments that make countries important 
to each other. In East Asia important initial investments in regional linkages 
were triggered by  imperial conquest-first  by  the Westem powers under the 
treaty port system, and then by Japan during its imperialist period. By the ad- 
vent of World War I1 these investments had transformed East Asia into perhaps 
the most interdependent region in the world. 
After World War 11 the intensity of East Asian interdependence resumed its 
prewar level. Subsequently, however, the region diversified its trade patterns, 
due to the important role of the United States in postwar Pacific relations and 
to the growing sophistication of the region’s industries. The trend toward diver- 
sification has been reversed in the last five or so years. Since 1985, spurred in 
part by  investment and aid, trade flows within East Asia have grown sharply 
and have become more regionally biased. 
An interesting question is how the recent flurry of regional policy initiatives 
will affect these trends. It is likely that the institutions created by these initia- 
tives will not be strong enough to liberalize regional trade. Even if  growing 
intraregional linkages create a demand for cooperation,  the diversity of  the 
region’s policy approaches makes broad, formal agreements difficult and un- 
likely. So far, collaboration has focused on narrow, highly pragmatic objec- 
tives-trade  cooperation in the context of MTAs and ASEAN, and technical 
cooperation in the context of APEC. 
For the time being, then, much of the region’s  business will be conducted 
through bilateral rather than multilateral institutions. Japan is raising its profile 
in regional  diplomacy as well as in economic cooperation and consultation. 
Intense series of Asian  visits are scheduled for the  emperor and the prime 
minister. Japanese ministries are also developing country-specific development 
plans and are encouraging their implementation with aid, expert advice, infra- 
structure lending, and support for private investment. 
The East Asian trading bloc has a long and complex history. Investments 
in this bloc, some made more than  a century ago, have proved  surprisingly 
durable. Today’s developments, likewise, may shape the pattern of East Asian 47  The East Asian Trading Bloc: An Analytical History 
trade far into the future. If  there are externalities associated with investments 
in bilateral trade, as the evidence here suggests, then the factors and policies 
that affect bilateral trade deserve more attention than they usually receive. 
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Comment  Stephan Haggard 
Peter Petri’s paper provides an excellent introduction to the question of region- 
alism in the Pacific. It combines an interesting theoretical idea, centered on 
transactions costs, the collation of new data on the extent of regional interde- 
pendence, and a stylized history that is attentive to political as well as eco- 
nomic variables. I want to begin by  placing Petri’s paper, and others in the 
volume, in the context of the larger debate about the regionaiization of the 
world economy, before turning to several specific comments. 
Recent debates have employed regionalism and regionalization to mean two 
quite different things. Regionalization may  be used to refer to an economic 
process in which trade and investment within a given region-however  de- 
fined-grow  more rapidly than the region’s trade and investment with the rest 
of the world; this is the definition typically adopted by economists, including 
Petri. Regionalization has also been used to refer to the formation of political 
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groupings, or “blocs,” that aim to reduce intraregional barriers to trade and in- 
vestment. 
Any discussion of regionalism must begin by keeping these two meanings 
of the terms separate, since the relationship between the two phenomena is far 
from clear. In this regard, it is useful to make a further distinction between 
economic and political explanations for the two types of regionalism, yielding 
the typology of different analytic approaches outlined in table lC.l. 
The economic explanation for increased regional integration (cell I) rests on 
“natural” economic forces of  proximity, income convergence, and intrafirm 
trade; in this view, regionalism may owe very little to policy-induced discrimi- 
nation. Proximity implies lower transport costs, higher information flows, and 
increased investment aimed at reducing transactions costs, the factor empha- 
sized by Petri. 
According to this view, the tendency toward greater intra-Asian trade should 
reflect only marginal preferences. There is no necessary tendency for these 
patterns to continue or deepen; the opposite may be the case. At some point, 
the advantages of extraregional diversification outweigh the economies associ- 
ated with regionalization, thus providing a mechanism checking the tendency 
toward continuing regional concentration. 
The “economic” perspective explains the emergence of  regional political 
cooperation in functional terms (cell 11). Regional agreements and institutions 
provide governance structures for managing increased economic integration; 
cooperation follows, rather than leads, trade and investment flows. Petri states 
this position succinctly when he argues that “a wide array of regional initiatives 
have recently emerged to address the new issues generated by East Asian inter- 
dependence. From an analytical perspective, these initiatives can be seen as 
attempts to reduce transactions costs in regional trade, manage intraregional 
trade frictions, and marshal regional economic forces against external eco- 
nomic challenges.” 
The economic perspective suggests several structural and policy conditions 
Table lC.l  Alternative Approaches to Regionalism 
Causes of Regionalism 
Economic  Political 
I 
Proximity, income convergence,  Regionalism defined as 
economic integration  intrafirm trade, policy 
convergence 
I1 
Regionalism defined as  Governance structures 
increased economic 
interdependence 
political cooperation  established to manage 
111 
Preferences favor intraregional 
over extraregional trade and 
investment 
IV 
Hegemonic power exploited, 
response to rival blocs. 
Dependence on domestic 
coalitions in member 
countries 50  Peter A. Petri 
that are likely to be necessary for successful regional political groupings to 
form. First, some threshold of economic integration is necessary for there to 
be an interest in the formation of  a regional political arrangement in the first 
place. Second, the expected gains from discrimination must apply universally, 
and not only to some members of the group. Cooperation can founder when 
gains are unequally distributed. 
Finally, the initial trade, investment, and macroeconomic policy stances of 
the countries should be broadly similar. Wide divergence in policies will make 
it more difficult to reach regional consensus because of the asymmetric nature 
of the concessions required of the more closed members. Divergent macroeco- 
nomic policies will imply unstable exchange rates, inhibiting both trade and 
investment, and differences in tax or regulatory regimes will create conflicts 
between countries with high and low levels of taxation and between countries 
with more or less strict regulatory norms. 
From a normative perspective, this economic view of integration empha- 
sizes the welfare gains to be achieved through trade creation and political co- 
operation, and assumes that the adverse effects to the rest of  the world  are 
limited. Under two conditions, regional organizations can provide “building 
blocks” for deeper integration: the arrangements must be liberalizing; and they 
must be nonexclusive in their membership. Arguably, this is what happened in 
the North Atlantic “region” in the immediate postwar period, flowering gradu- 
ally into what we now know as multilateralism. 
The political  view of regionalization tends to see the growth of intrabloc 
trade primarily as a consequence of policy decisions, either already taken or 
potential (cell 111). The emphasis is on an “unnatural” regionalism constructed 
on the basis of intraregional preferences that discriminate against extraregional 
trade and investment. The main puzzle, therefore, is to explain these policy 
choices.  In  doing  so, the  political  economy  view  draws  attention  to  both 
the internal and domestic factors that the functional economic view ignores 
(cell IV). 
Countries may be motivated to construct regional “fortresses” for a number 
of  international political as well as economic reasons. First, and most obvi- 
ously, the formation of blocs provides a means of countering competitive pres- 
sures from outside the region by providing more assured markets within it. 
Second, blocs might initially be formed to gain bargaining leverage vis-a-vis 
other regional blocs. Interbloc negotiations could eventually produce liberaliz- 
ing outcomes, but it is also possible that bargaining dynamics could degenerate 
into competitive protectionism rather than a liberal equilibrium. 
Finally, intraregional arrangements  between  larger and  smaller countries 
may reflect hegemonic power relations. Regional hegemons can exploit bilat- 
eral asymmetries in interdependence to exercise monopoly and/or monopsony 
power over smaller and poorer trading partners and to extract policy changes 
that favor the regional hegemon. Under such a scenario, regionalism will not 
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Such power can ultimately be turned to political objectives, as is seen in ex- 
treme form in Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere or Nazi trade 
policy in central Europe during the 1930s. 
The economic view emphasizes the aggregate welfare gains from integra- 
tion and thus implicitly assumes the easy reallocation of resources necessitated 
by increased trade. The political perspective, by contrast, places greater em- 
phasis on the distributional effects of economic integration within countries. 
Integration will  have  adjustment costs,  and  thus  the  viability of  regional 
agreements will hinge in part on domestic political coalitions and conflicts 
within potential members. This is the main theme of the Frieden and Froot 
and Yoffie contributions to this volume, though they stress different cleavages: 
Frieden’s is rooted in a real exchange rate analysis, Froot and Yoffie’s distin- 
guishes between sectors with declining versus rising returns to scale. 
Before situating Petri’s arguments, it is important to tackle a prior question: 
whether there is in fact any evidence of increased economic regionalization in 
East Asia. There is no reason to repeat the findings that are neatly summarized 
in table 1.  I, except to note that Petri pays particular attention to trends in the 
East Asian figures, when on both the absolute and relative measures, there is 
also evidence of a deepening of the Pacific Rim region as a whole; I will return 
to this point below. 
Petri’s explanation for East Asian regionalism has two steps. First, a shock 
increases interdependence; second, this shock increases returns to investments 
that further reduce transactions costs, creating a virtuous circle of further trans- 
actions. It is not theoretically clear why this virtuous cycle would continue. 
Why don’t  the advantages of  diversification come to outweigh continued in- 
vestment in regional linkages? Put differently, why does Petri believe there 
are increasing, rather than decreasing, marginal returns to such transactions 
costs-reducing  investments? 
My second broad comment concerns a kind of asymmetry in the historical 
argument of  the paper. The first two phases of  integration are attributed to 
imperialism, but the third is not. This suggests an alternative argument that is 
familiar to political scientists, namely, that patterns of  economic integration 
are determined by hegemonic actors. 
What Petri’s account shows, however, is that hegemons operate in quite dif- 
ferent ways. British imperialism was aimed primarily at overcoming Chinese 
resistance to free trade. But the British conception was essentially nondiscrimi- 
natory, in that other imperial powers were allowed to benefit from the opening 
of the treaty ports. From the perspective of the other imperial contenders in 
the region, including the United States, Britain’s  victory in the Opium War 
constituted a pure public good. 
Petri’s assertion about the effects of these arrangements on regional interde- 
pendence are somewhat misleading, however, because they include entrepijt 
trade via Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Singapore, most of which was directed to 
Europe and India. If this entrepijt trade is removed, the degree of intraregional 52  Peter A. Petri 
interdependence fostered by British penetration would be much less. Rather, as 
a theory of hegemony would predict, the region’s trade was ultimately directed 
toward the European metropolitan powers or their colonies, particularly India. 
The Japanese empire, of course, was organized on a fundamentally different 
basis, and suggests that the term “reducing transactions costs” can be some- 
what euphemistic. Though Japan reduced transactions costs for Japanese ex- 
porters and investors, the government was clearly intent on raising them for 
everyone else through the imposition of  formal and informal preferences. In 
developing the transactions costs approach, therefore, it is crucial to consider 
the extent to which the transactions cost-reducing  investment is a private, club, 
or public good. 
The U.S. strategy resembles to a greater extent the British one, though ini- 
tially without the same emphasis on forcing liberalization on strategic allies. 
The result of this strategy was a steady increase in Pacific Rim interdependence 
on all three of Petri’s measures between 1955 and 1979, and conversely, a de- 
cline in the intraregional share. The reason for this pattern was that first Japan, 
then  the  East  Asian  newly  industrializing  countries  (NICs), and  then  the 
ASEAN countries adopted export-led growth strategies that were targeted on 
the United States. Moreover, the United States encouraged them to do so, both 
through its exchange rate policy and through bilateral influence on economic 
policy in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. 
Thus, while Petri emphasizes transactions costs in his model of regionalism, 
there is an implicit political explanation of regionalism lurking in the paper, in 
which the preferences of the hegemonic actor play a crucial role in the pattern 
of trade and investment. Petri’s conclusion that “postwar trends in East Asian 
interdependence have been driven by market rather than political forces” ig- 
nores the role of the grand strategy of the United States in reconstructing the 
region as a component of its political-military effort to contain China and the 
Soviet Union. 
This political argument also explains why the emergence of  an exclusive 
East Asian bloc, or even the further deepening of intra-Asian trade and invest- 
ment, is unlikely. First, Japan, the NICs, and ASEAN all remain heavily depen- 
dent on the US. market and thus ambivalent about political initiatives that 
would exclude the United States. Second, it is highly unlikely that Japan will 
be able economically to play the role of absorber of regional exports that the 
United States has played. And finally, even if Japan could play this role eco- 
nomically, the countries of the region may have valid political reasons to diver- 
sify their trade and investment relationships in order to guarantee that Japan 
would not be in a position to exercise undue influence. 